Garthoff was mistaken, however, when he concluded that "although the restructuring of the Soviet Union failed, the restructuring of international relations succeeded."61 Having failed to understand the reasons for the Cold War's end, the United States pronounced a "New world Order" that, first and foremost meant that the U.S. "forestall the rise of 'peer competitors.'"62
Partisan politics were also at play. In 1994, Frank Gaffney (a former assistant to one of the Reagan administration's most notorious hawks, Richard Perle, and head of a conservative think tank) convinced Congressman Newt Gingrich to include in his 1994 "Contract with America" a provision "requiring the Defense Department to deploy antiballistic missile systems capable of defending the United States against ballistic missile attacks."63 He worked tirelessly to convince leaders of the Republican Party that "missile defense could be a winning issue in the 1996 presidential election against Bill Clinton."64
And although additional evidence has emerged recently to further expose the partisan nature of the Rumsfeld Commission's report,65 concerns by Republicans and the government of Israel about the transfer of missile technology from Russia to Iran were legitimate. They appear to remain legitimate today.66
Nevertheless, misquided faith in Reagan's legacy, especially concernng the efficacy of weapons technology, plays a large role in the Bush administration's decision to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty next month in order to pursue various paths to deploying a layered national missile defense system. And this, notwithstanding a national intelligence estimate (in January 2002) that acknowledges, according to one report, that "rogue states or terrorist groups are unlikely to use missiles as their method of choice for delivering weapons of mass destruction."67
Even prior to the reemergence of national missile defense in 1998, however, the U.S. had squandered its honeymoon with post-Soviet Russia by failing to deliver the economic aid Russians expected and by reneging on Secretary of State Baker's promise to Gorbachev that, with his help to permit a unified Germany within NATO, "there would be ironclad guarantees 'that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward'"68 Making matters worse was the bombing of Yugoslavia, which violated the 1997 "Founding Act" that committed Russia and NATO to refrain "from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter."69
Notwithstanding such errors and policies, President Clinton's Secretary of State would claim that the U.S. "stands taller than other nations, and therefore sees further."70 Not to be outdone in hubris, the younger Bush administration would have its incoming Secretary of State, Colin Powell, suggest that "the U.S. can do pretty much what it wants because its sophisticated democracy makes it politically and morally superior to the rest of the world -- and sometimes even exempts it from international norms and treaties."71
Were one to examine William Zimmerman's superb analysis of the foreign policy views of Russian-- based upon polls conducted in 1993, 1995, 1999 and a reinterview in 2000 -- he would find that the Russian attitude toward America had deteriorated significantly.72
Finding that his study of Russian attitudes confirmed the categories -- of elites, attentive public and masses -- found in studies of the foreign policy views of Americans, Zimmerman also confirmed that Russia's attentive public serves much the same purpose as it does in America -- to adopt and transmit elite opinions to the largely ill-informed masses. He also found that, as in the United States, the attentive public does not play its designated role very well when resistance among the masses is high.
As Zimmerman notes, "the fundamental instinct of mass publics is isolationist."73 Elites are both more "militantly internationalist" and more "cooperatively internationalist." Nevertheless, "in 1999 and 2000, as they had been in 1993 and 1995, the [Russian] mass publics were more isolationist than were the elites, though they were significantly more hard line than they had been in 1993 and 1995."74
During the 1990s, increasing wariness, if not hostility, toward the United States caused Russia's leaders to reject Gorbachev's vision of mutual security and adopt foreign policy realism. Thus, Vladimir Putin might very well be Russia's foremost realist. Yet Putin's realism is "cooperatively internationalist," especially since September 11th, when he cast his country's lot with the U.S. in its war against terrorism. Putin recognizes, as one analyst recently noted, "that an alliance with the West is the only path to Russian economic progress and protection against Islamic fundamentalism."75
However, as noted Russia scholar, Stephen F. Cohen, observed last November: "It is unlikely that Putin can stay the American course against terrorism without significant concessions, if only because he is surrounded by political elites deeply distrustful of Washington and unhappy with his decision."76 Writing in the April 15, 2002 issue of The Nation, Katrina vanden Heuvel and Cohen state that "the opinion [is] spreading across Moscow's political spectrum that the Bush Administration's war on terrorism now has less to do with helping Russia -- or any other country -- fight Islamic extremism on its borders than with establishing military outposts of a new (or expanded) American empire...with control over the region's enormous oil and gas reserves as its primary goal."77
Moreover, "not surprisingly, President Putin, Bush's alleged 'partner,' is coming under increasing high-level attack in Moscow as a result of White House policies. Putin's policies have unleashed angry charges that he is 'losing' Central Asia and the Caucasus while succumbing to US imperialism. Of special importance, and virtually without precedent in Soviet or Russian history, has been a series of published 'open letters' signed by retired generals, including one of former President Yeltsin's defense ministers, accusing Putin of 'selling out' the country and 'betraying' the nation's security and other vital interests."78
And it appears that elite sentiment is filtering down to the masses. According to one survey, "the number of Russians who regarded Russian-American relations as 'friendly' or 'good' dropped from 20 percent in September 2001 to 13 percent in March 2002."79
Thus, the Bush-Putin Summit being held as we speak might reverse an ominous trend. Atmospherics alone should help. But Russian and American analysts already are questioning the value of a written arms control agreement that fails to make the nuclear arms reductions irreversible, just as they are wondering whether the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) will be any more satisfying than the highly disappointing NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council it replaces. A Public Opinion Foundation poll of 1,500 Russians, conducted just prior the Reykjavik summit that announced the new NRC, found that 52% of the respondents were "convinced that NATO is a security threat to Russia," (although only 44% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 35 thought so).80
A cynic might also question whether President Bush's signature on this nuclear pact will "begin the new era of U.S.-Russian relationships"81 as Mr. Bush claims, or whether it simply provides political cover for a useful subordinate on the eve of America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
In either case, unless the U.S. and Russia come to some agreement on national missile defense or unless relations improve substantially, the American decision to deploy weapons in space -- already a foregone conclusion among America's missile defense enthusiasts -- will probably become the issue that strains relations to the breaking point.
Because Russia already possesses the capability to penetrate any NMD system that the U.S. might deploy within the next fifteen to twenty years,82 and has serious doubts about America's ability to even deploy an effective system, the world must immediately worry more about China's response to America's post-ABM treaty NMD efforts (and thus India's and Pakistan's). But, at some point, given America's technological utopianism, American efforts to weaponize space will persuade Russia's leaders that the U.S. is not content with a limited NMD system designed to protect against rogue states, but intends to pursue a system that renders it invulnerable to any retaliatory strike, including Russia's.
Given the enormous role that Russia's nuclear arsenal currently plays in defending the Russian people, such a move by the U.S. would constitute a hostile act that would demand a response and, consequently, Russia's return to the arms race. No longer could Russia afford even a well-founded complacency.
About the Author
Walter C. Uhler, the Defense Contract Management Agency's Chief of Operations for Lockheed Martin Delaware Valley, has studied and written about Russian and military history for approximately 30 years. He received a BA in Political Science and another in Russian language from the Pennsylvania State University. He also received a Certificate for completion of Russian Area Studies and a Masters of Public Administration from Penn State. His Master's Essay compared the weapons' acquisition practices of the US and the USSR. Articles, reviews and OP-EDs by Mr. Uhler have been published in The Nation, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Moscow Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Defense News, The Journal of Military History, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Russian History, the Naval War College Review and Government Executive. The January 28, 2002 issue of The Nation contains his very relevant article, "Missile Shield or Holy Grail?"
In addition, Mr. Uhler has testified about missile defense before state legislatures and has given radio interviews -- on defense matters and Russian-American relations -- to stations across the United States.
Mr. Uhler has approximately twenty-five years of professional weapons' acquisition experience within the Department of Defense. Nevertheless he appears today in his capacity as a private citizen and scholar. Nothing contained in this article should be construed to represent the official position of DCMA or the Department of Defense.
Footnotes
62) Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," The National Interest (Spring 2002), p. 125
63) Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, Gerald E. Marsh, The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001), p. 39..
65) Michael Dobbs, "The Missile Trail: An Intelligence Turnaround, How Politics Helped Redefine the Threat," Washington Post (January 14, 2002)
66) Michael Wines, "U.S. Expects Russian Help To Stem Nuclear Weapons: Link to Iranian Arms Program is a Priority," The New York Times (May 15, 2002).
68) Leon V. Sigal, Hang Separately: Cooperative Security between the United States and Russia, 1985-1994 (New York, The Century Foundation Press, 2000), p. 56.
69) Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (New York, Public Affairs, 2001), p. 87.
70) Anatol Leiven, "Against Russophobia," World Policy Journal (Winter 2000/01), p.25.
71) The Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2001.
72) William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2002).
75) Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor," Johnson's Russia List (May 7, 2002).
76) Stephen F. Cohen, "Second Chance With Russia," The Nation (November 5, 2001).
77) Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, "Endangering US Security," The Nation (April 15, 2002).
81) The New York Times, May 14, 2002. p.A8.
82) Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has stated that "we are going to do everything to counter these threats when they take shape, if they ever take shape, which is to say not before 2015-2020." "Russia planning to counter US missile shield; defence minister." AFP (March 28, 2002) CDI Russia Weekly # 199.
© Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, 2002