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Letter of April 2000. Issue #3. COMMENTS ON THE BILL ON RATIFICATION OF
START II PASSED BY THE STATE DUMA

Ivan Safranchuk

PIR ARMS CONTROL LETTERS

LETTER OF APRIL 2000, ISSUE #3.

©PIR CENTER. April 14, 2000

The bill for the law was worked out by the Committee on International
Affairs and the Defense Committee and is a compromise document. The main
objective in the course of its elaboration was to highlight all the problems
of the treaty, widely illustrated by its critics, but in a way that would
not rule out the possibility of ratification. This determined the structure
of the bill:

    a.. ascertaining of ratification (Art. 1);


    b.. conditions of implementation, i.e. extraordinary events which would
give Russia the right to withdraw from the treaty (Art. 2, 3, 4);


    c.. other conditions of its fulfillment;


    d.. statement of authority and responsibilities of the President, the
Government and the Parliament in the course of carrying out the treaty (Art.
7, 8);


    e.. conditions for exchange of instruments of ratification (Art. 9).


Extraordinary events, giving the Russian Federation the right to withdraw
from the treaty, are listed in Article 2 and contain principal critical
remarks on the actions of the United States and NATO. These actions, in the
view of the opponents of the treaty, may diminish the possibility of its
ratification and implementation. They include:



    a.. breach of the START II Treaty on the part of the United States of
America (paragraph 1);


    b.. the United States of America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or its
infringement (paragraph 2); agreements on the ABM systems signed in New York
in September 1997 are not mentioned but are implied by the phrase about
"respective agreements";


    c.. deployment by the United States of America or any other state
whatsoever of the armaments, preventing normal functioning of the Russian
system of early warning of missile attack (paragraph 5);


    d.. deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member
states (paragraph 4); this provision is largely toned down, although its
meaning is quite clear: "taking and implementation by the United States of
America, or any other state whatsoever, or alliances, and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization among them, of decisions in the field of military
development, which threaten the national security of the Russian Federation,
including deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the states
having joined NATO after the date of the START II Treaty signature".


To avoid giving Article 2 an outright anti-American and anti-NATO character,
the authors included words like "any other state whatsoever" and two
additional provisions, which state other circumstances enabling Russia to
withdraw from the treaty, i.e.:



    a.. build-up of strategic offensive arms of states that are not parties
to the START II Treaty;


    b.. "extraordinary events of economic or technical origin, which make it
impossible for the Russian Federation to fulfil its obligations under the
START II Treaty or jeopardize the environmental security of the Russian
Federation".


According to Article 3, in case of extraordinary events, giving the Russian
Federation the right to withdraw from the Treaty, the President should
eliminate the aforesaid threats, neutralize their consequences (paragraph
1a) or provide for immediate consultations with the Parliament (paragraph
1b). The Parliament can address the President with a proposal to begin
consultations (paragraph 2).


Another condition of the START II implementation is the conclusion of START
III. The importance of this issue is emphasized through making a separate
Article 4 of the bill. Along with general arrangements, like "preservation
and further enhancement of strategic stability at the lowest possible levels
of strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation and the United States
of America", the Article includes some specific clauses such as to:



    a.. "exclude the possibility of rapid increase in the number of nuclear
warheads attributed to all types of launchers" (paragraph 3);


    b.. "provide for equal rights and opportunities for the Parties in the
process of elimination and disposal of nuclear warheads" (paragraph 4);


    c.. "provide for accounting of all types and systems of strategic arms"
(paragraph 6).


If the Parties don't sign START III the President should hold consultations
with Parliament. "The President of the Russian Federation shall hold
consultations with the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation and, taking into account the results of these consultations, take
decisions relating to the START II Treaty, including the introduction of
motions under Section V of the Federal Law "On International Treaties of the
Russian Federation"." This section deals with suspension of implementation
or withdrawal from international treaties.


There were proposals for a stricter wording of the Article that provides for
Russian reaction to extraordinary events giving the right to withdraw from
the treaty. For instance, in the previous Duma Alexei Mitrofanov (LDPR - the
Zhirinovsky Party) insisted on the following version of the aforesaid
paragraph, "The Russian Federation shall be free to not observe the
provisions of START II if…". At first, he sent this motion to the Committee
on International Affairs, which didn't take it into account, and then it was
forwarded to Speaker of the Duma Gennady Seleznyov, but was also neglected.


Other conditions of implementation are mentioned in Articles 5 and 6. One of
them refers to the United States, i.e. the US compliance with the provisions
of START I (Art. 5, paragraph 3). Another is connected with START III
arrangements, although this is not stated directly: "equal rights and
opportunities for the Parties of the START II Treaty in carrying out
inspections and other verification procedures; preservation and improvement
of the national technical means of verification of the Russian Federation in
order to observe the United States of America's fulfillment of the START I
and the START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty" (Art. 5, paragraph 7). Other
circumstances relate to the competence of Russian authorities:



    a.. preservation of the Russian strategic nuclear forces' might (Art. 5,
paragraph 1);


    b.. appropriate financing of the Russian strategic nuclear forces (Art.
5, paragraph 2);


    c.. reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation,
provided for in the START II Treaty, taking into account their period of
operation (Art. 5, paragraph 4);


    d.. maintenance of combat readiness of the Russian strategic nuclear
forces, irrespective of any development of strategic situation (Art. 5,
paragraph 5);


    e.. providing for safe use, storage, elimination and disposal of
strategic offensive arms (Art. 5, paragraph 6).


Article 6 requires that the President should approve the Federal Program of
Development of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation and
present it to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly no later than two months
after entry into force of the ratification law. At the same time, no later
than three months after entry into force of this law, the Government should
work out and submit to the President the Special Federal Program of
Elimination and Disposal of Weapons and Materiel of Strategic Nuclear Forces
"providing for the use of reduced components and infrastructure in the
interests of national economic development".


The rights and duties of the President, the Government and the Parliament in
the course of implementation of the treaty are stated in Articles 7 and 8.
They reflect established practice and in a way repeat the provisions of
other laws regulating the activities of the above-mentioned bodies and
Russian foreign policy in general.


According to paragraph 2 of Article 7, the Russian Government is in charge
of carrying out routine work of START II implementation. However, it's the
President who takes "decisions on the terms and procedures of
decommissioning and deactivation of strategic offensive arms, provided for
in the START II Treaty".


In compliance with Article 9 of the bill, exchange of instruments of
ratification (i.e. treaty's entry into force) should be done upon completion
by the United States of America the procedure of ratification of the START
II Treaty, including protocol relating to it and the ABM agreements of
September 26, 1997, signed in New York. This means that before that the
treaty will not become effective.


The bill on ratification leaves unsolved the problem of financing the
implementation of START II. It's doubtful that Russia will be able to
provide financial means for the fulfillment of the treaty. In this
connection, it was suggested that the bill include the following article:
"The Russian Federation shall follow the commitments under the START II
Treaty, depending on Russian financial capabilities. Partial fulfillment of
the obligations, provided for in the START II Treaty, which is caused by the
lack of such financial means, given that it has objective character and is
determined by a general state of Russian economy and the amount of foreign
assistance, shall not be regarded by the United States as a violation of the
START II provisions on the part of the Russian Federation." This proposal
wasn't taken into account by the authors of the bill.

The principal conclusion we can draw after analyzing the bill is that its
main objective is to throw the ball into the US court. During elaboration of
the document, attention was focused on drawing a bill which could be passed
by the State Duma and would, at the same time, be accepted by the United
States. The bill takes into consideration all the major claims and
objections of START II opponents. However, they are stated in a way that
will allow for the ratification and implementation of the treaty. At the
same time, there are some hurdles - above all, the financial problem of
ratification – which, in future, may delay the fulfillment of the treaty.