Marat Kenzhetaev
Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
Moscow Institute of Physics and
Technology
July 1996
Nuclear and
Missile Proliferation Issues:
The Case of
Kazakhstan.
The world NPT regime has faced a major challenge following abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union - one of the world's two nuclear superpowers - into 15 new independent states. One of them - Russia has inherited the nuclear status of the former USSR, three others - Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - have had Soviet nuclear strategic weapons stationed on their territory. Besides, elements of nuclear production infrastructure and maintenance activities have been located also on the territory of the other former Soviet republics. When the Soviet Union broke up, 104 SS-18 ICBMs (1040 nuclear warheads) and 40 Bear-H strategic bombers (with an estimated 370 warheads) were deployed in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan had active involvement in the nuclear industry of the FSU. The Pricaspian mining-metallurgical combine on Mangyshlak peninsula was one of the largest producers of natural uranium, and the Oskemen Ulba Works was a key facility for the Russian nuclear fuel cycle, supplying beryllium, zirconium and other materials and some components used in nuclear power reactors.
After dissolution of the Soviet Union Republic of Kazakhstan inherited approximately 50 different enterprises of the former Soviet defense complex.
But the main contributions of Kazakhstan to the military potential of the former Soviet Union was test of military hardware and military exercises. Vast and sparsely inhabited areas of Kazakhstan were used for tests of nuclear weapons and missiles as well as other types of weapons of mass destruction (including bio) and conventional arms. The well-known Semipalatinsk nuclear test site was not the only military test range on Kazakh territory. Others include the Baikonur cosmodrome, still being used by Russia as space launch center, and the Sary-Shagan center used to be a main Soviet center for testing air defense and anti-missile (ABM) systems. According to some sources, there were 8 test sites in all, which occupied 7 per cent of the country's territory. The republic also has a very serious legacy of environmental pollution arising from weapons testing over many years.
There were speculations about nuclear and missile-producing capabilities of some of some the former Soviet republics. The case of Kazakhstan needs to be mentioned in this relations. Kazakhstan alone is larger than the whole of Western Europe. In addition to petroleum and natural gas, the region has uranium and uranium ore-processing complex. In addition the above-mentioned mining facilities directly related to nuclear weapon production cycle of the FSU one should take into consideration that Kazakhstan possesses well-developed chemical industry, as well as several branches of machine-building and tooling industries. Under the policy of regional, industrial specialization which was typical for planned, centralized economy of the FSU it was a dedication of Kazakhstan to be a major source of energy materials, metal ores and strategic metals for the defense industries of the USSR. In comparative terms enterprises belonging to manufacturing industries belonging to manufacturing industries on territory of Kazakhstan were not very numerous.
Today approximately 90 percent of defense industry of Kazakhstan are grouped under two power-state companies - KORGAU and KATEP. Nine tenths of nuclear-oriented plants and facilities of the nuclear industry now come under KATEP state company. ……..
The principal centers of the Kazakh defense industry are Petropavlovsk in the north of the country, Oral and Aqtau in the west, Oskemen - east, Akmola in the center of Republic, and the capital, Almaty, in the south. Products of enterprises in Oral include heavy machine-guns and small arms, equipment and munitions for the Navy (inc. anti-ship missile systems). In Petropavlovsk the machine-building plants produced missile launcher systems and short range ballistic missiles (almost all components, including guidance systems) and a set of missile systems for Navy; may also build armored vehicles. The town of Kurchatov near the former nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk has a major nuclear industry research center....
Regardless of location in Kazakhstan of few large industrial facilities which were playing important roles in nuclear device and missile production, the existing high degree of industrial specialization prevents Kazakhstan from becoming an independent producer of nuclear explosive devices of any type, or of ballistic missiles. Kazakhstan mining industry produces natural uranium, and many types of metal ores elements that are necessary for fabrication of modern nuclear weapons. But there has never been entire technological chain capable of production of nuclear weapons of ballistic missiles. Explosives, for example are not produced in the republic; even for industrial applications the republic has to import them from Russia. Paradoxically, but there are sites in Kazakhstan where high technology products were developed and tested (f.e., research and engineering on nuclear propulsion technology were conducted in the closed city of Semipalatinsk-21). Another example of modern technology - Aqtau nuclear power station operated since 1973 mainly for fresh water production. This power reactor belongs to still rare generation of nuclear brider-reactors. Even now there are less than 10 reactors of the same type in the world.
It happened that Kazakhstan prove to be a storage site for a couple of nuclear explosives devices which were prepared for underground tests in the Semipalatinsk region, and 600 kg of highly enriched uranium alloy. (lately this material was sold to the USA and transported to Oak Ridge., Tennessee, under the operation “Sapphire”). There are several other unique defense or dual-use facilities inherited by Kazakhstan in 1991 from the former military superpower. Some of them still playing a key role for the Russian space and defense production and tests.
As subsequent years demonstrated, the CIS states have managed, on the whole, to cope with the problems of ensuring the centralized (Russian) control over the nuclear arsenal deployed across the FSU despite al the hurdles - economic, political and national difficulties. An agreement reached in Moscow on 28 March 1994 between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbaev, called for the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads to Russia be mid-1995 and dismantlement of all SS-18 silos and missiles by mid-1997. No agreement has been reached between Almaty and Moscow on fissile material compensation. Kazakhstan ratified START 1 on 2 July 1992 and deposited its instruments of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on February 1994
Although keen on maintaining its independence, Kazakhstan has also managed to keep good security relations with Russia. An original signatory of the January 1993 CIS Charter, including its collective security pact, the government in Almaty shares Moscow’s concerns with threats from the South (Muslim fundamentalism) and from the East (China). Despite the Chinese nuclear arsenal, however, Kazakhstan decided not to incur political and economic costs of clinging to the nuclear weapons formerly deployed on its territory. Finally, the need to attract foreign investments (f.e.: US investments in the oil industry) has also contributed to Kazakhstan making good on its non-nuclear pledges. Geopolitically Kazakhstan is located in close neighborhood with two nuclear weapon powers - Russia and China. Evidently it is very difficult for this country to pursue completely independent foreign policy, taking into account close economic ties with Russia, and high percentage of non-Kazakh population (mostly Russians). Russia still may treat Kazakhstan as one of its own valuable assets from the point of view of its industrial potential and natural resources. Russia will continue to need Kazakh space launching sites for civilian and military space programs. (The Tyuratam launch site in Kazakhstan was used by Soviet/Russian Space Military Forces to put in orbit photo-reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, ocean reconnaissance and Glonass navigation satellites and Soviet anti-satellite (ASAT) system, and to lift the largest Proton and Energia boosters).
In the future, Kazakhstan is likely to rely substantially on Russia for the supply of nuclear fuel for its Aqtau nuclear power station and for several R&D reactor as well. In co-operation with Russian enterprises some military production may well be maintained.
It seems that the only proliferation threat associated with Kazakhstan is a possibility of nuclear theft or illegal trade of some military hardware, nuclear components and materials. Kazakhstan has an access to a host of technologies useful in nuclear-related programs, as well as to the technology to build cruise and ballistic missiles, or some of their components. Kazakhstan has never been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and neither adheres formally or informally to MTCR restrictions. Its export control structure is still in formative stage.
From the other side it is very difficult to imagine a domestic or international situation which could force Kazakhstan to initiate independent production of indigenously developed ballistic missiles or nuclear explosive devices. Kazakhstan undoubtedly has the potential to produce them concentrating all its human and economic resources. But scenario completely contradicts realities of foreign and domestic policy of Kazakhstan as well as its existing economic and technological resources.
APPENDIXES:
Reactor BN-350
· Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR)
· Began operation in 1973
·
Produces 200 MWt for desalination of fresh water
(2/3 for near mining sites)
addition
135 MWe power output (0.7% total Kazakhstan's electricity production)
· fueled 20% enriched uranium (UO) 80 t/y.
· It was designed to use uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel as well. Beginning in 1990, a series of experiments were conducted in which weapon grade plutonium-based MOX fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor. This R&D program, which have been canceled after 1991, was forerun by recent Minatom proposals to introduce plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads into the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.
· Reactor operated by Aqtau Mangyshlaksky Energy Combine which is affiliated with the KATEP state company.
· Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency has licensed the reactor to continue operation until 2003. When a replacement reactor (possible light-water reactor from Russia or the West) is supposed to be ready. Russian nuclear industry representatives have also proposed the construction of two or more advanced fast-breeder reactors and establishment of plutonium separation facility at Aqtau as long as Kazakhstan accedes to the NPT.
· Spent fuel from the plant is normally returned to Russia for reprocessing. Recently, however, Russian fuel fabricators (Electrostal) have refused to supply fuel to the Aqtau reactor for financial reasons. Similarly, the Mayak Chemical Combine at Chelyabinsk-65 has been reluctant to accept spent fuel from Aqtau for storage and reprocessing.
Oskemen
Ulba Metallurgical Plant Joint Stock Company
· Was set up in 1949. Since then, the plant’s mission has changed several times. The fuel-fabrication production lines now in operation at the plant were installed in 1974.
· The plant converts hexaflouride of low-enriched uranium dioxide (UO2 ) powder, which is subsequently fabricated into fuel-pellets for VVER-440/1000 and RBMK reactors. The pellets are sent to fuel-fabrication facilities near Moscow (Elektrostal) as well as Novosibirsk for production of fuel rods and assemblies. Historically, the facility at Oskemen produced nearly all of the UO2 powder and most of the fuel pellets in the Soviet Union.
· In addition, the Ulba plant was the major producer in the Soviet Union of the dual-use metal beryllium, beryllium oxide ceramics for nuclear and aero-space industries, the metal tantalum, superconducting composite materials, non-ferrous and rare-earth metals.
· The plant now operates well below its peak capacity (5000-6000 MT of UO2 per year. Although it still produces about 80% of the UO2 for the Soviet-built reactors, it will see a competition in the future from the plant in Electrostal, which is developing capabilities to produce UO2 powder and pellets for VVER-440 reactors.
·
·
An Agreement between the
Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Nuclear Energy
co-operation.
23 September 1993
· The Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency and the Russian nuclear regulatory body (Gosatomnadzor) have also recently agreed on uniform regulatory procedures and the continuation of supervision of Kazakhstan's nuclear facilities by Russian authorities.
· KATEP and Minatom are now engaged in negotiations regarding the provision of credit to Kazakhstan for the purchase of nuclear fuel and the possibility of swapping Aqtau's debt to Russia fuel fabricators for the debt Russia fabricators to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
· Kazakhstan continues to cooperate with Techsnabexport (Tenex), Minatom's trading agent and the nuclear trade monopolist during the Soviet period.
· Kazakhstan participates in the Concern Atomredmetzoloto, a voluntary association of uranium producers from FSU that provides scientific support and assets in the procurement of raw materials and equipment.
· Kazakhstan signed an agreement with Russia whereby four Kazakh military bases will come under Russian control, some Kazakh units will form joint forces with Russian units, military cooperation will increase, and the rights of Kazakhs and Russians in each other's countries will be reciprocally observed. January 25, 1995
·
Kazakhstan
and Russia are working on an agreement governing use of the anti-ballistic
missile and air defense testing range at Sary-Shagan. In exchange Kazakhstani
military specialists are to receive training in Russia. May 1994
·
On 28
March an agreements between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the
Baikonur space center. Under the terms of the Baikonur agreement, Russia will
lease the complex for twenty years for $115 million annually, with an option to
prolong the lease for an additional ten years. The agreement provides for the
cost of the lease to be deducted from Kazakhstan's debt to Russia. Russian
military and civilian personnel employed at Baikonur will be subject to Russian
law.
Semipalatinsk
· Semipalatinckis most closely associated with nuclear testing. The sprawling test complex also houses a major nuclear research programs at a variety of localities. The administrative center of the test site is the city of Kurchatov (Semipalarinsk-21), which is located near the Irtush river. During the 1960s and 1070s, a number of experimental facilities were set up at Semipalatinsk by the Russian-based Research and Production Association ‘Luch’ as part of the Soviet Union’s program for testing rocket engines, space-based nuclear power propulsion plants and their components. These facilities included the Baikal-1 Reactor Complex, located 65 km south of Kurchatov, and the IGR Reactor Complex, located 50 km southwest of the city.
· The Baikal-1 complex housed two research reactors, a water-moderated IWG.1M reactor which was initially designed as a nuclear rocket engine prototype, and a RA (modified IRGIT, nuclear rocket engine) high-temperature gas-cooled experimental reactor which is used to study the stability of nuclear fuel. The IWG.1M reactor was redesigned in 1989-90 to test nuclear power reactor which reactor fuels. Two additional IRGIT reactors were reportedly tested at the Baikal-1 complex but were dismantled after the tests.
· The IRG Reactor Complex was the site of an impulse graphite-moderated reactor used between 1961 and 1988 for experiments in the development of nuclear rocket engines and nuclear propulsion power plants. The most recent experiments involving the reactor focused on nuclear safety (e.g. loss of coolant and melt-down accident) and material irradiation (e.g. metals, carbides, minerals and silicon compounds)
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL
REGIME (04/87)
SUMMARY OF THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ANNEX
Category I
· Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to arrange of at least 300 km as well as specially designed production facilities for these systems.
· Individual rocket stages;
· Reentry vehicles;
· Solid or liquid fuel rocket engines;
· Guidance sets;
· Thrust vector controls;
·
Warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms.
Category II
· Propulsion components.
· Propellants and constituents.
· Propellant production technology and equipment.
· Missile structural composites: production technology and equipment.
· Pyrolitic deposition/densification technology and equipment.
· Structural materials.
· Flight instruments, inertial navigation equipment, software, and production equipment.
· Flight control systems.
· Avionics equipment.
· Launch/ground support equipment and facilities.
· Missile computers.
· Analog-to-digital converters.
· Test facilities and equipment.
· Software and related analog or hybrid computers.
· Reduced observables technology, materials, and devices.
· Nuclear effects protection.