Military and Technical Cooperation of Kazakhstan: Prospects and Structure
//"Russian-Kazakhstan Military and Technical
Cooperation: Structure and Perceptive"
The prospects the of international military technical relations of Kazakhstan are determined, essentially, by the following factors:
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Geopolitical situation: intermediate between centers of bipolar forces Russia-China, India-Pakistan, Iran.
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Foreign policy factor: as the sovereign state, the republic can independently determine the main trends and volumes of military technical cooperation (1).
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Features of military and industrial complex infrastructure inherited after the USSR:
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high, up to 85 %, cooperation degree of defense industry;
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absence of finished systems of armament;
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availability of testing grounds and polygons on the territory of republic;
On the basis of the aforementioned classification military technical cooperation structure and factors determining the prospects of Kazakhstan's MTC, for the needs of analyse, all the partners of Kazakhstan (existing and potential) shall be divided into three major groups: Russian Federation, CIS countries and foreign states.
Military technical cooperation with Russian Federation
Due to historic, economic and political reasons the Russian Federation is a natural and principal partner of Kazakhstan in the field of the military technical cooperation (in nearest and long-term prospects). This is confirmed by numerous declarations of State's officials and substantial number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and contracts binding both states. This can be quite logically explained.
Firstly, there is a high degree of economic integration of both states. For example, Kazakhstan and Russia are mutually the largest trade partners for each other - the share of Kazakhstan in trade turnover of Russia with CIS countries is ca. 20 % (2), which is the highest index among all the CIS countries (3).
Secondly, this politico-military reasons (strategic partnership, collective security, military alliance, united armed forces, border guard troops, air defense, AWACS, testing grounds and so on). If one enumerates briefly the main items of mutual interests of both states, the following list is obtained: raw materials, energy, transport routes, trade, joint enterprises, space center, testing grounds. Of course, from the viewpoint of priorities, the sequence order of items on this list would be different for each state (4), but all of them together create the base for mutually beneficial cooperation in military and military technical areas.
From economic or financial points of view, total volumes of trade turnover of Russia with Kazakhstan (ca. 5 mird dollars) (5) are considerably higher than possible volumes of military technical cooperation of both countries (ca. several hundreds of millions of dollars), however the priority of the TMC before commercial exchanges consists in the integration of also military, political and even strategic aspects. Besides, the today's reality is such, that the Kazakhstan is one of the largest customers of weapons import for Russia (according to SIPRI data, in 1995 Kazakhstan was among five largest importers of Russian weapons), but Russia is almost unique client of Kazakhstan in the field of military technical cooperation. Of course, the relations in this area with other states are not ruled out, but the real advantages generated until now by contracts with other states are doubtful, as from economic (ca. several dozens of millions $), as from politico-military points of view (6). Ultimately, concerning the military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan, one might say that this republic is "devoted", at least presently, to "joint activity with Russian Federation in exploitation of elements of defense industrial complex inherited after the Soviet Union, after its disintegration, and in cooperation in manufacturing and export of armaments and military technology.
The characteristic feature of Kazakhstan military technical cooperation with Russia is that both states are clients each other, and both are suppliers and importers of defense systems, equipment and components of military purpose and services of military technical character. It is possible to say boldly, that Kazakhstan's military technical cooperation is unique due to its several specific features, and this specificity is patent namely in collaboration with Russian Federation. Apart from direct mutual deliveries of finished weapons systems, there are other forms of cooperation between both countries:
I. Deliveries of military technology and property, components and equipment, carrying out a joint activity in the field of development and manufacturing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double, civilian-military, purpose etc. by defense industrial enterprises of both countries within frameworks of industrial cooperation, interstate (intergovernmental) agreements and contracts.
II. Supplying services of military purpose, carrying out joint activity in the field of development and testing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double purpose (testing grounds and research centers).
III. Supplying services and carrying out joint activity etc. "in exploitation and development of technical and industrial potential of space base "Baykonur".
Analysis, evaluation of volumes and details of military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation.
I. Supplies of military technology and property, components and equipment by defense industrial enterprises of both states
Recently, by joint efforts of coordination headquarters of military collaboration. Defense Ministries of the CIS states has been elaborated and approved by the Council of heads of the governments of CIS the leading program of military technical cooperation of CIS member-countries (7). Within frameworks of this program "Decision concerning the procedure of organization and execution of repairs of armament and military technology in overhaul enterprises of Defense Ministries of CIS member-countries" has been adopted. According to this decision, as well as to series of legislative acts of the Russian Federation in the field of MTC, the dispatch of weapons and military equipment to repair is carried out (should be executed) without licenses, on the basis of army orders, without customs duties, fees and taxes.
In February 1995, the heads of the governments of CIS states arrived to conclusion on the need to upgrade the joint air defense. As consequence, the decision to establish the federal enterprises group MFPG "Granit". In this group the participation of Armenia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tadzhikistan and Ukraine enterprises manufacturing the equipment and components of air defense systems was proposed. At the beginning of 1997, the effective work in this group was being executed by Russian enterprise "Granit", Byelorussia production scientific union "Granat" and specialized plant at Bishkek. In years 1997-98, Kazakhstan was supposed to join this group (8).
Mutual deliveries of components and equipment by defense industrial enterprises of both states are a very complex question and will not be developed in present article. However, we can say, that for the of absolute majority of earlier existing defense enterprises of KazakhSSR manufacturing components and military equipment, the Russian enterprises were customers, marketing agents and procurement sources. Nevertheless, since USSR disintegration the need of Russian manufacturers of defense production in deliveries from CIS countries underwent a substantial change. Thus, on the list of enterprises of CIS countries, the collaboration with which is regarded as economically and technologically justified (9) today, remain only 223 enterprises from more than thousand remaining outside the Russian Federation (10). Among them only 6 % (in total 13-14 enterprises) are from Kazakhstan. The needs of Kazakhstan enterprises also have changed, noneless it is possible to claim that the cooperation degree with Russian enterprises in military production remains high.
II. Supplying services of military purpose, carrying out of joint activity in the field of development and testing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double purpose, (military testing grounds and research centers)
On the 20 January 1995, the presidents of both states B.Yeltsin and N. Nazarbayev signed in Moscow a series of agreements between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of use and lease of testing ranges Sary-Shagan (11) and Emba (12), as well as about use of the 4th state central polygon (13) and of the 929-th state flight test center of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (14). Although these agreements were signed in January 1995, conclusive entering into force (the ratification by the State Duma of Russian Federation) has not been enforced as yet. The President of Russian Federation B.Yeltsin has repeatedly submitted these agreements to Duma (for example, in August 1997, in April 1998), but they are not ratified (15) until now.
Probably, the volumes has not been finally defined, the mechanism and the type of settlements, which would be fully satisfactory for both sides. At the beginning of 1997, Nazarbayev declared that "Russia is owing to Kazakhstan 126 million dollars (16) for lease of military testing ranges (17). Concerning the above mentioned testing ranges (Sary-Shagan and Emba and 4th and 929-th polygons of the Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation), it was reported, that the lease would be borne by Russia at the amount of 27,5 million dollars (18) per year, and ca. 3 millions will be paid in currency, while main part of the amount - 24, 3 million dollars - would be compensated by deliveries of the armament and military technology, first of alt aircraft Su-25, Su-27 and MiG-29, air defense weapons, infantry weapons (19). Moreover, namely as a counterpart of testing ranges lease the training of military personnel will be carried out. In this area, thre have been bilateral agreements dated 1992, between Defense Ministries of Russia and Kazakhstan (20), however, their validity was cancelled in the first half of 1997 by the Russian side. It is possible, that this event has been associated with problems of financement of this activity by Kazakhstan side. Nonetheless, in late October, the Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev declared that defense ministry of Russian Federation will continue the aid to Kazakhstan in the preparation of military personnel both in Russia, and in the military air force academy of Kazakhstan (21). The following figures are given: from the sum due to Kazakhstan by Russia for polygons lease, ca. 4 million dollars annually, about one thousand of Kazakhstan servicemen would be trained in Russian military academies. Thus, the lease will be paid by Russia would be paid partially in cash, partially by personnel training, but the essential part by the armaments and military equipment deliveries. Hereby, apparently, the above list of intended armaments deliveries is without any relation to already executed deliveries of armaments and military equipment in past years (1995-97) (22). I.e. the compensation deliveries of equipment would be carried out in the near future, and possibly, in considerable volumes.
Thus, the volume of military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation in exploitation of testing ranges and centers would be valued in financial terms at the amount of 27,5 - 43,0 million of dollars per year. Hereby, these values are today low limits (probably most "realistic"), since, firstly, the figure 27,5 corresponds in reality to only 2 Kazakhstan testing ranges, although their total number is higher (23), and, secondly, it exactly coincides with value of "the Russian debt for lease of military polygons)), claimed by N. Nazarbayev, if one supposes, that this figure amounts to the debt for all the period of Kazakhstan sovereignty.
IV. Supplying services and carrying out joint activity in exploitation and development of technical and industrial potential of space base "Baykonur"
On the 28th March 1994, the presidents of both states, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed in the name of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan an agreement concerning main principles and conditions of exploitation of "Baykonur" space base. This agreement actually determined the space base status and put an end to numerous claims advanced by both sides about property, status (24), principles of exploitation of this largest infrastructure of the Soviet space (military and civil) sector. According to the agreement and subsequent Leasing contract (25), Russia obtains the space base in lease for the period of 20 years, with a possibility of further prolongation after expiration of a lease period (26). The financial terms of agreement fix the rent to 115 million dollar annually. Although, in the second half of 1994 the appropriate federal law of Russian Federation (27) and the government decree (28) of Russian Federation were edicted defining theoretical dates (29) and amounts (30) of "Baykonur" financing, the procedure of settlement satisfying both sides remains unclear until now. In consequence Russian debt to Kazakhstan amounts to 345 million dollars (31) for Baykonur lease (32). The Russian position in this case is the following: the leasing payments shall be automatically deducted from the Kazakhstan national debt, which presently amounts to ca. 1, 8 mird dollars (while the total Russian debt to Kazakhstan is ca. 1,3 roird dollars) (33). Kazakhstan's side insists on, that the lease should be paid annually and in cash (34). Certainly, both sides understand well that these are two opposite positions, and in the future they have to find compromise.
IV. Direct mutual deliveries of finished products - weapon systems : details, analysis and conclusions
Epigraph: "We are manufacturing armaments being supplied mainly to Russia, and purchasing them mainly in the same Russia..." (35)
1. Direct Russian deliveries of finished products - weapon systems (AME) to Kazakhstan
The largest deliveries of Russian armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan are deliveries (36) of combat aircraft, according to agreement of 1995, on account of offset (37) against the deployment of strategic bombers on the territory of Kazakhstan (38). The structure and the details of deliveries are presented in table 1. According to the above mentioned agreement, Russia was obliged to deliver 73 aircraft : 21 MiG-29, 14 Su-25 and 38 Su-27 (39). First 43 units were planned for delivery in 1995, remaining 30 in the following two years (40), i. e. until the end of 1997. However, the analysis of declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan at the end of October 1997 in Alma-Aty (41) indicates that till October 1997 42) 41 aircraft, among which only 6 Su-27 had been delivered. Taking into account declared projected delivery of four Su-27 till the end of 1997 and very probable delivery of additional 10 units in the end of 1997- beginning of 1998 (43), it turns out that today unbalanced Russian obligations concerning 73 units of combat aircraft amount to further 18 Su-27 fighters. The official financial evaluation of deliveries data is not known, however , the defense ministers of both states declared, the total value of fighters of different types supplied to Alma-Ata is equal to the worth of all the weaponry taken from Kazakhstan to Russia after disintegration of the USSR (44). In carrying out evaluation of financial equivalent of these deliveries of aircraft in table 1: "Deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan", we obtain their value ca. 1,3 milliard dollars in "minimal" most reliable figures (45) and ca. 2 milliard dollars in "maximal " figures (46). Thus, the volumes of delivery of combat aircraft in financial terms are rather considerable in total and in annual values - estimates are comprised between ca. 280 million dollars in 1995, 256 in 1996, and will be about 800 million dollars in the years 1997-98 (47).
Apart from Russian deliveries of combat aircraft, the transfer of a substantial number of armored vehicles (48) is also mentioned: 55 armored infantry vehicles BMP2, 63 T-72 tanks and 10 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (49). The total value of these deliveries is ca. 94-110 million of dollars (50). It is not known for sure in which form Kazakhstan has paid these deliveries, however, it can be assumed that they have been performed according to "offset" principles without real currency payments (51). Nonetheless, we will use above values for the Russian deliveries volume evaluation (52).
Taking this into account, the total values of Russian deliveries of aircraft and armored equipment to Kazakhstan, executed in 1995 and 1996, would be respectively: 280 million dollars in 1995 (53), 350 million dollars in 1996 and at least 100 million dollars in 1997 (54). These values constitute 4-10 % of the official volume of Russian export of armaments and military equipment for 1995-97. It is not known, how the deliveries made by official Russian organizations (55) to Kazakhstan have been accounted, logically one can suppose, that they were labelled in the "line of deliveries on the basis of intergovernmental agreements". However, firstly, this is rather wide concept, in which can be comprised also deliveries of other types, and, secondly, this title is absolutely not used (56) in the case of discription of the military technical cooperation. Therefore, we have to assume, that the deliveries to Kazakhstan could have been accounted in some other usual (57) way. For example, if one supposes, that they were included in book-keeping records as "deliveries as compensation of Russian debt", then the deliveries to Kazakhstan correspond to almost half of deliveries executed by Russia in 1996 as the offset of the national debt. If they were accounted as " clearing " deliveries, we have an evidence of the absolutely amazing fact, that almost 100 %(!) of clearing armaments deliveries of Russian Federation in 1996 were oriented to Kazakhstan (58).
The deliveries of equipment from Russia to Kazakhstan are confirmation of the fact that the military technical cooperation is not a pure weapons trade. The Russian experts and journalists criticizing Russian politics in the field of military technical cooperation for insufficient economic efficiency or excessive commercialization, intentionally or not consciously forget that the purpose of the "international activity" called military technical cooperation is not only to gain currency resources , but also to "ensure national security, economic and politico-military interests of the state", thus MTC are complex interstate relations with several aspects. The deliveries of equipment to Kazakhstan reach absolutely all targets of the military technical cooperation (59), whereby they are bilateral:
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they ensure a national security and politico-military interests of states - Kazakhstan obtains a modern military equipment corresponding nominally to three air force regiments and four motorized infantry battalions (60) (two of them armored 61)), as a consequence, the increase of level of combat preparedness and efficiency of republican air forces, the strengthening of "Southern, Eastern Kazakhstan-Russian borders control at the Chinese side";
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they safeguard political interests - execution of contracted intergovernmental obligations, realization of interstate agreements on "collective security " and "joint air defense " etc.;
Direct deliveries of weapons systems from Kazakhstan to Russian Federation
The situation of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of armaments and military equipment greatly differs from the above described Russian ones (70). If to consider only direct deliveries of finished weapons systems, among all known officially executed deliveries can be mentioned only export (71) to Russia in 1995 of two fighters MiG-29 and four bombers Su-4M. In corresponding records of Russian Federation imports the import of four "combat aircraft ", without specifying type of aircraft, is mentioned. The details and terms of deliveries are not known. In data about deliveries of 4-6 combat aircraft there is quite a lot of discrepancies:
firstly, differences in number of exported and imported aircraft; secondly, the types of aircraft exported by Kazakhstan makes arise questions why MiG-29, since in the Russian armed forces there are analogous types of fighters (72), and in aviation construction enterprises their substantial quantity is manufactured, why aircraft not needed (for export nor for own air forces)?; and Su-4M bombers, model produced in the years 40 have only historic value, as one of very rare and first bombers of "Su" family 73), but in no way of military-technical importance; finally, why these delivery data have been submitted to United Nations Organization register as export/import data by officials of both states, which should understand the difference between export/import of military equipment and its simple displacement through customs borders, for purposes different from commercial ones? (74)
All these contradictions can be rationally explained. Concerning four Su-4M combat aircraft exported by Kazakhstan, it can be assumed that in given case there was an evident error at one of information processing or publication stages, the name of aircraft was incorrectly labelled, most likely it was the export of four Su-24M (75) (or possibly Su-22M4 or even Tu-22M4 (76)), however, as in the case of MiG-29, the situation is unclear, since in Russia there are substantial quantities of analogous aircraft.
Moreover, since the data on deliveries have been represented to the United Nations Organization register and are labelled as export/import by administration officers of both states, it can be assumed that the combat aircraft were not merely displaced, for example in order to make repairs, but really have been exported/imported for commercial (or military-technical) purposes.
A re-export of combat aircraft of this type to third countries is most probable. Most likely, namely this circumstance explains the difference between numbers of exported and imported combat aircraft: for example, Russia have informed about import of 4 aircraft, although Kazakhstan exported 6, because she was an intermediary in further delivery of 2 of them, or as new owner in case of re-export. Concerning possible countries of destination, to which combat aircraft could be exported, there is no reliable information, however, when analyzing data on composition of aviation of various states furnished by AW & ST and Teal Group Corp. (77), as well as weapons and military equipment deliveries data of Russian Federation and CIS countries for years 1995-98, we conclude that, if the deliveries of these combat aircraft to third countries were executed, most likely they were considered only as Russian, or half-official or unofficial (78).
As a whole, the prospects and the extent of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Russia are only symbolical: Kazakhstan being not a manufacturer of finished units of armaments and military technology, these prospects are limited by transfers of specimens of technology of old Soviet origin (79), deliveries of complete armaments within framework of manufacturing cooperation or joint production (80) etc.
In conclusion, the prospects and the volumes of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Russia are limited. The volumes of direct deliveries of complete weapons systems in the nearest future are nil. In any case, the growth of volumes of direct deliveries by Kazakhstan of finished weapons systems to Russia is possible only in case of evident Russian interest, and only with direct Russian participation in manufacturing of the weapons systems.
List of References
1) Kazakhstan administration policy of reinforcement of independence and sovereignty of the country determines also its intention to fix independently orientations of main trends and volumes of the military technical cooperation.
2) the share of Kazakhstan in Russian import - 6, 6 % in 1996 and 5, 2 % in 1997; total Russian import in 1997 amounted to 71 milliard dollars (increase by 6% as compared with 1996) ; "Payment balance of Russia in 1997, "Finansovye Izviestia", 36 (486), 26 / 05 / 1998 3) although the Russian share in Kazakhstan's trade turnover is only 7 % ", according to declaration of Russian Federation Vice-Prime-Minister, Viktor Khristenko, made during the press conference on 8 / 09 / 98 at Almaty.
4) although Russia is interested in testing grounds and defense industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan, due to different reasons, first of all economic ones, the shifting of her interests to mainly testing grounds is most probable; however, Kazakhstan, from viewpoint of its social and economic conditions, is more interested in acquisition of delivery orders for its defense enterprises for re-launching or reorientation of the defense industry.
5) ca.5, 2 mlrd dollars in 1997.
6) the question is about the point of view whole state, although from viewpoint of one or several enterprises the orders amounting to several dozens million dollars are quite interesting.
7) approved in December 1994 by the Council of Defense Ministers of CIS.
8) the author has no reliable information about Kazakhstan's participation in MFPG " Granit ".
9) for Russia, and not for Kazakhstan
10) Andrei Zagorskiy "Export of conventional armaments " No 8-9,1997, PER Center.
11) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of exploitation and lease of the test range Sary-Shagan and ensuring of activities of Priozersk town ", signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
12) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of exploitation and lease of the Emba testing range " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
13) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on the conditions of use of the 929th national flight test center (the structures and testing grounds located on the territory of Kazakhstan) of the Defense Ministry of Russian Federation " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
14) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on conditions of use of the 4th central national testing range (the structures and testing ranges located on the territory of Kazakhstan) of the Defense Ministry of Russian Federation " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
15) Although, on the testing ranges leased by Russia, now, the development and tests of weapons systems are carried out For example: September 1997. testing of aerial defense missile system "Bnk-Ml" purchased by Finland in Russia, October 1998. control tests of Tu-160 (X-65) and other.
16) Interview of Nazarbayev "Niezavisimaya Gazieta ", "Russia could become an axe of friendship, but she did not". "NG" daily, dated 16th January 1997.
17) In this case is not known about what periods and testing ranges he speaks. Here, various interpretations are possible: if the testing ranges referred to higher, L e. relating to concluded bilateral agreements, the period would be apparentlyl995-96 (with possible inclusion of preceding year), the maximal "leasing fee" should not exceed 63 million dollars per year. The inclusion of the year 1994 decreases this figure to 42 millions. If this count is made starting with 1992, the annual figure is 25,2 million dollars per year. However, such a "leasing fee " is less probable, since it would be less than 27,5 million dollars per year for four the above mentioned testing ranges.
18) "Kommersant Daily ", 01/04/ 98; "VTS ", Nol3,1998, ITAR-TASS ; electronic data base
"Vega" of INFO-TASS, 29.10.97; "VTS ",No 44,1997.
19) Ibid.
20) "Agreement between Defense Ministry of Russian Federation and Defense Ministry of Kazakhstan on training of officers in military academies " from the 19th August 1992.
21) information of news agencies with references to declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan in Almaty, Renter from 29/10/97; RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97 and other.
22) commercial " deliveries of armaments and military equipment (73 combat aircraft etc.) in offset for nuclear weapons and military equipment retrieved from Kazakhstan. See paragraph "direct deliveries" and tables.
23) it is possible: that the figure 43 million dollars corresponds to lease value for all the testing ranges and military centers, from the time of achieving consensus in bilateral agreements concerning testing ranges.
24) See Supplement 1: "Space base "Baykonur" - protocol".
25) Lease agreement concerning "Baykonur" complex between Government of Russian Federation and government of Kazakhstan from 10th Decembers 1994.
26) It would be more exact to say, that after expiration of the leasing contract on "Baykonur" between the Government of Russian Federation and Kazakstan government from 10th December 1994, which "is extended by ten years, if neither Party will not submit a written notification about its intention to terminate the present agreement at least 6 months prior to its expiration date.
27) Federal law of the Russian Federation about ratification of the agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about main principles and conditions of "Baykonur" space base use;
adopted by the State Duma on 21st July 1994, approved by the Council of Federation on the 7th October 1994.
28) Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation from 29th August 1994 No 996 "0n measures to ensure the implementation of agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about main principles and conditions of "Baykonur" space base use " from 28th March 1994.
29) "The Government of Russian Federation will decide to open credit for lease payment for complex "Baykonur" and compensation of material expenses of Kazakhstan incurred for maintenance and operation of complex "Baykonur" " - executed in 1992 - 1993 after ratification of a treaty of "Baykonur " complex lease, the federal law of Russian Federation "on ratification of Agreement".
30) "Ministry of Finances of Russian Federation will allocate in 1994 115 million of US dollars to "Baykonur" complex leasing, as well as to "Baykonur" complex maintenance in the limits foreseen by the 1994 federal budget, namely: for Defense Ministry of Russian Federation for space base - 191,2 milliard rubles; for Russian space agency - 179,2 milliard rubles, including 53,8 milliard rubles on exploitation expenses, 17,6 milliard rubles on purchases of serial space technology, 15,8 milliard roubles on civil engineering works, 91 milliard rubles on the maintenance of Leninsk town". The government decree of Russian Federation from 29th August 1994, No 996.
31) Interview of Nazarbayev "Nezavisimaya Gazieta", "Russia could become an axe of friendship, but she did not", "NG" daily, dated 16th January 1997.
32) apparently, this concerns the period 1994-96,115 million dollars per year
33) " Kommersant DAILY ", 01/04/98; "MTC" No 13,1998, ITAR-TASS.
34) Ibid.
35) the interview with the officer of the international security office of the Ministry of Interior of Kazakhstan "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", "NG", 27.07.96, p.3; "MTC", 29 July- 4 August 1996, GK "Rosvooruzhenie ", ITAR-TASS.
36) executed, in execution and planned; deliveries beginning in 1995
37) Agreement on offset for retrieved military equipment, July 1995, within framework of "Agreement on military cooperation" 1994. SIPRI Yearbook 1996 makes reference to information supplied by Interfax agency on the 8th November 1995; "MTC " 25/11/1996.
38) "at the time of USSR disintegration, in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan, the base Dolon according to Western sources) were deployed the 79th heavy bombers division of the 30th Irkutsk air army, comprising 1223rd and 1226th aviation regiments of Tu-95MS (27 Tu-95MS6 and 13 Tu-95MS16), book "Strategic nuclear armaments of Russia ", Moscow, 1998, Center of studies of disarmament problems. This number of strategic bombers of Tu-95M model (40 units) corresponds to half of all the bombers of this type having been in the inventory of Soviet long-range aviation in 1990.
39) Electronic data base "Vega" of INFO-TASS, 29/10/97; "MTC " No 44, 1997, "Rosvooruzhenie ", ITAR-TASS. Reuter news agency has been reporting, that apart from MiG-29, Su-25 and Su-27 to Kazakhstan were supplied also L-39, however the analysis of the total combat aircraft inventory resulting from other sources indicates it was erroneous Information (the for example wrong interpretation of "trainer aircraft" concept and resulting substitution of Su-27UB to trainer aircraft L-39), or else the data concerning trainer planes were not included in the overall total of 73 wombat aircraft ";
40) SIPRI Yearbook 1996, makes reference to Interfax agency information from 8 November 1995
41) Reuter news agency from 29/10/97; Electronic data base "Vega" of INFO-TASS, from 29/10/97;
RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97.
42) declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, Igor Sergejev and Mukhtar Altynbayev
43) the author's evaluation, probably the date is different -1998
44) information of RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97
45) "minimal most reliable"- the cost value or calculated according to data of analytical agencies
46) "maximal prices" or so-called "market prices", or contract prices for the analogous Russian deliveries to foreign countries
47) if the aircraft equipment deliveries to Kazakhstan will be completed in 1998
48) SIPRI Arms Trade Database 1997
49) see the table "Deliveries of Armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan
50) analogously, as in the case of aircraft, for "minimal most reliable prices" and "maximal prices"
51) in this case, the "real" total amount of deliveries shall be much lower than 94-100 million dollars, since these deliveries are not commercial deliveries" according to a number of features, and secondly, due to the fact that "they are released from the stock of Russian troops" the price paid for these armaments will be tenfold lower than that of "export products" and there is no information concerning their upgrading up to "export products" standard, the total amount will be substantially lower
52) but not payments!
53) According to SIPRI data the deliveries of armored equipment were executed inl996
54) taking into account 4 Su-27 in 1997; this figure can be increased by 100 million to 350 million dollars, if to take into consideration deliveries of additional 10 Su-27 units; See table 1
55) the situation of deliveries of armaments from Russia to Kazakhstan and the mutual government obligations are such, that it is rather difficult to determine the category to which the deliveries belong, and how they are accounted in official records
56) it means "this concept is not used in mass media, such categories are not mentioned in publications of official organizations (they are used in Russia, in American practice this concept is used, but in somewhat other sense),
57) i.e. among commonly available in the literature, and about which a sufficiently reliable information is available
58) this is quite probable, since there is no reliable detailed information about any "clearing " deliveries in 1996, although the press reports the total annual amount of 350 million dollars
59) in this case all the aspects of MTC are present, whereby financial-economic aspect is minor and does not play the first role, in contrast to majority of deliveries executed by Russia in recent years, as a rule with application of commercial principles, or to be more exact, with prevailing financial-economic aspect. This is true with rare exception of, for example, "free of charge " deliveries of armaments to Bulgaria, planned "financial-political" deliveries of aerial defense systems C-300 to Cyprus. However, it is necessary to notice, that although these deliveries are not purely commercial, the financial-economic considerations, in contrast to Kazakhstan case, are not minor: Cyprus contract firstly, is "paid in hard currency "; secondly, it is rather important in volume; thirdly, it constitutes a breakthrough on the principally new markets by promoting a probable conclusion of large contracts with other states (Greece or Turkey); finally, in the fourth place, according to available information there are also private, not only state's financial interests involved around the contract activities. It's very likely that in Cyprus contract the financial-economic aspect has the same importance, as the political or that it is even much stronger. Concerning Bulgarian deliveries of armored equipment, it is possible that the economic aspect is rather important: firstly, "the bondage" with this equipment occurs with a possibility to make in the future "not-free-of-charge" deliveries of replacement parts, components etc.; secondly, "the bondage" to Russian models of armaments facilitates a conclusion of contracts concerning deliveries of other types of Russian armaments, for example of aviation equipment; thus, it turns out that the economic interests in the given case of "free of charge " deliveries could be also important
60) now Kazakhstan considers the possibility of reforming the organization of its ground forces based until now on the previously existing Soviet system, wherein the division was a main tactical formation of army, and the regiment was a main tactical, structural element of battlefield, to a new one, more mobile system with brigade-battalion; perhaps this circumstance explains the fact that the number of units supplied to Kazakhstan fits better to numbers required by battalion, rather than by regiment.
61) it is understood that in previously existing Soviet ground troops organization system the nominal number of tanks per armored battalion of motorized infantry regiment differs from the number of tanks per battalion of armored regiment
62) the maintenance of production capacities and the achieving of appropriate social goals.
63) achieving of internal technical goals of Russian armed forces.
64) according to available information this principle was respected in deliveries of Su-27 fighters.
65) intergovernmental, it is possible also to say "a kind of offset" deliveries, if all the types of deliveries should be subdivided into those paid in currency and those settled as compensation.
66) though in Kazakhstan this bondage is already maximal.
67) obviously, a pure economic profit-earning in this case is substantially lower than in the case of commercial" deliveries.
68) according to mutual accounts and book-keeping records data
69) for example, the payment of lease for military testing ranges
70) we do not include in our considerations the "retrieval of strategic arms" - ICBM, cruise missiles, the long-range aviation etc.
71) according to data concerning Kazakhstan published in the United Nation Organization register 1995.
Marat KENDJETAYEV
Military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan :prospects and structure
The prospects the of international military technical relations of Kazakhstan are determined, essentially, by the following factors:
1. Geopolitical situation : intermediate between centers of bipolar forces Russia-China, India-Pakistan, Iran.
2. Foreign policy factor : as the sovereign state, the republic can independently determine the main trends and volumes of military technical cooperation.
3. Features of military and industrial complex infrastructure inherited after the USSR:
high, up to 85 %, cooperation degree of defense industry;
absence of finished systems of armament;
availability of testing grounds and polygons on the territory of republic;
On the basis of the aforementioned classification military technical cooperation structure and factors determining the prospects of Kazakhstan's MTC, for the needs of analyse, all the partners of Kazakhstan (existing and potential) shall be divided into three major groups:
Russian Federation, CIS countries and foreign states.
Military technical cooperation with Russian Federation
Due to historic, economic and political reasons the Russian Federation is a natural and principal partner of Kazakhstan in the field of the military technical cooperation (in nearest and long-term prospects). This is confirmed by numerous declarations of State's officials and substantial number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and contracts binding both states. This can be quite logically explained.
Firstly, there is a high degree of economic integration of both states. For example, Kazakhstan and Russia are mutually the largest trade partners for each other - the share of Kazakhstan in trade turnover of Russia with CIS countries is ca. 20 %, which is the highest index among all the CIS countries.
Secondly, this politico-military reasons (strategic partnership, collective security, military alliance, united armed forces, border guard troops, air defense, AWACS, testing grounds and so on). If one enumerates briefly the main items of mutual interests of both states, the following list is obtained: raw materials, energy, transport routes, trade, joint enterprises, space center, testing grounds. Of course, from the viewpoint of priorities, the sequence order of items on this list would be different for each state, but all of them together create the base for mutually beneficial cooperation in military and military technical areas.
From economic or financial points of view, total volumes of trade turnover of Russia with Kazakhstan (ca. 5 mird dollars) are considerably higher than possible volumes of military technical cooperation of both countries (ca. several hundreds of millions of dollars), however the priority of the TMC before commercial exchanges consists in the integration of also military, political and even strategic aspects. Besides, the today's reality is such, that the Kazakhstan is one of the largest customers of weapons import for Russia (according to SIPRI data, in 1995 Kazakhstan was among five largest importers of Russian weapons), but Russia is almost unique client of Kazakhstan in the field of military technical cooperation. Of course, the relations in this area with other states are not ruled out, but the real advantages generated until now by contracts with other states are doubtful, as from economic (ca. several dozens of millions $), as from politico-military points of view. Ultimately, concerning the military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan, one might say that this republic is "devoted ", at least presently, to "joint activity with Russian Federation in exploitation of elements of defense industrial complex inherited after the Soviet Union, after its disintegration, and in cooperation in manufacturing and export of armaments and military technology.
The characteristic feature of Kazakhstan military technical cooperation with Russia is that both states are clients each other, and both are suppliers and importers of defense systems, equipment and components of military purpose and services of military technical character. It is possible to say boldly, that Kazakhstan's military technical cooperation is unique due to its several specific features, and this specificity is patent namely in collaboration with Russian Federation. Apart from direct mutual deliveries of finished weapons systems, there are other forms of cooperation between both countries :
I. Deliveries of military technology and property, components and equipment, carrying out a joint activity in the field of development and manufacturing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double, civilian-military, purpose etc. by defense industrial enterprises of both countries within frameworks of industrial cooperation, interstate (intergovernmental) agreements and contracts.
II. Supplying services of military purpose, carrying out joint activity in the field of development and testing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double purpose (testing grounds and research centers).
III. Supplying services and carrying out joint activity etc. "in exploitation and development of technical and industrial potential of space base "Baykonur".
Analysis, evaluation of volumes and details of military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation.
I. Supplies of military technology and property, components and equipment by defense industrial enterprises of both states
Recently, by joint efforts of coordination headquarters of military collaboration. Defense Ministries of the CIS states has been elaborated and approved by the Council of heads of the governments of CIS the leading program of military technical cooperation of CIS member-countries (7). Within frameworks of this program "Decision concerning the procedure of organization and execution of repairs of armament and military technology in overhaul enterprises of Defense Ministries of CIS member-countries" has been adopted. According to this decision, as well as to series of legislative acts of the Russian Federation in the field of MTC, the dispatch of weapons and military equipment to repair is carried out (should be executed) without licenses, on the basis of army orders, without customs duties, fees and taxes.
In February 1995, the heads of the governments of CIS states arrived to conclusion on the need to upgrade the joint air defense. As consequence, the decision to establish the federal enterprises group MFPG "Granit". In this group the participation of Armenia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tadzhikistan and Ukraine enterprises manufacturing the equipment and components of air defense systems was proposed. At the beginning of 1997, the effective work in this group was being executed by Russian enterprise "Granit", Byelorussia production scientific union "Granat" and specialized plant at Bishkek. In years 1997-98, Kazakhstan was supposed to join this group.
Mutual deliveries of components and equipment by defense industrial enterprises of both states are a very complex question and will not be developed in present article. However, we can say, that for the of absolute majority of earlier existing defense enterprises of KazakhSSR manufacturing components and military equipment, the Russian enterprises were customers, marketing agents and procurement sources. Nevertheless, since USSR disintegration the need of Russian manufacturers of defense production in deliveries from CIS countries underwent a substantial change. Thus, on the list of enterprises of CIS countries, the collaboration with which is regarded as economically and technologically justified (9) today, remain only 223 enterprises from more than thousand remaining outside the Russian Federation (10). Among them only 6 % (in total 13-14 enterprises) are from Kazakhstan. The needs of Kazakhstan enterprises also have changed, noneless it is possible to claim that the cooperation degree with Russian enterprises in military production remains high.
II. Supplying services of military purpose, carrying out of joint activity in the field of development and testing of weapons and military equipment and development of technologies of double purpose, (military testing grounds and research centers)
On the 20 January 1995, the presidents of both states B.Yeltsin and N. Nazarbayev signed in Moscow a series of agreements between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of use and lease of testing ranges Sary-Shagan (11) and Emba (12), as well as about use of the 4th state central polygon (13) and of the 929-th state flight test center of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (14). Although these agreements were signed in January 1995, conclusive entering into force (the ratification by the State Duma of Russian Federation) has not been enforced as yet. The President of Russian Federation B.Yeltsin has repeatedly submitted these agreements to Duma (for example, in August 1997, in April 1998), but they are not ratified (15) until now.
Probably, the volumes has not been finally defined, the mechanism and the type of settlements, which would be fully satisfactory for both sides. At the beginning of 1997, Nazarbayev declared that "Russia is owing to Kazakhstan 126 million dollars (16) for lease of military testing ranges (17). Concerning the above mentioned testing ranges (Sary-Shagan and Emba and 4th and 929-th polygons of the Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation), it was reported, that the lease would be borne by Russia at the amount of 27,5 million dollars (18) per year, and ca. 3 millions will be paid in currency, while main part of the amount - 24, 3 million dollars - would be compensated by deliveries of the armament and military technology, first of alt aircraft Su-25, Su-27 and MiG-29, air defense weapons, infantry weapons (19). Moreover, namely as a counterpart of testing ranges lease the training of military personnel will be carried out. In this area, thre have been bilateral agreements dated 1992, between Defense Ministries of Russia and Kazakhstan (20), however, their validity was cancelled in the first half of 1997 by the Russian side. It is possible, that this event has been associated with problems of financement of this activity by Kazakhstan side. Nonetheless, in late October, the Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev declared that defense ministry of Russian Federation will continue the aid to Kazakhstan in the preparation of military personnel both in Russia, and in the military air force academy of Kazakhstan (21). The following figures are given: from the sum due to Kazakhstan by Russia for polygons lease, ca. 4 million dollars annually, about one thousand of Kazakhstan servicemen would be trained in Russian military academies. Thus, the lease will be paid by Russia would be paid partially in cash, partially by personnel training, but the essential part by the armaments and military equipment deliveries. Hereby, apparently, the above list of intended armaments deliveries is without any relation to already executed deliveries of armaments and military equipment in past years (1995-97) (22). I.e. the compensation deliveries of equipment would be carried out in the near future, and possibly, in considerable volumes.
Thus, the volume of military technical cooperation of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation in exploitation of testing ranges and centers would be valued in financial terms at the amount of 27,5 - 43,0 million of dollars per year. Hereby, these values are today low limits (probably most "realistic"), since, firstly, the figure 27,5 corresponds in reality to only 2 Kazakhstan testing ranges, although their total number is higher (23), and, secondly, it exactly coincides with value of "the Russian debt for lease of military polygons)), claimed by N. Nazarbayev, if one supposes, that this figure amounts to the debt for all the period of Kazakhstan sovereignty.
IV. Supplying services and carrying out joint activity in exploitation and development of technical and industrial potential of space base "Baykonur"
On the 28th March 1994, the presidents of both states, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed in the name of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan an agreement concerning main principles and conditions of exploitation of "Baykonur" space base. This agreement actually determined the space base status and put an end to numerous claims advanced by both sides about property, status (24), principles of exploitation of this largest infrastructure of the Soviet space (military and civil) sector. According to the agreement and subsequent Leasing contract (25), Russia obtains the space base in lease for the period of 20 years, with a possibility of further prolongation after expiration of a lease period (26). The financial terms of agreement fix the rent to 115 million dollar annually. Although, in the second half of 1994 the appropriate federal law of Russian Federation (27) and the government decree (28) of Russian Federation were edicted defining theoretical dates (29) and amounts (30) of "Baykonur" financing, the procedure of settlement satisfying both sides remains unclear until now. In consequence Russian debt to Kazakhstan amounts to 345 million dollars (31) for Baykonur lease (32). The Russian position in this case is the following: the leasing payments shall be automatically deducted from the Kazakhstan national debt, which presently amounts to ca. 1, 8 mird dollars (while the total Russian debt to Kazakhstan is ca. 1,3 roird dollars) (33). Kazakhstan's side insists on, that the lease should be paid annually and in cash (34). Certainly, both sides understand well that these are two opposite positions, and in the future they have to find compromise.
IV. Direct mutual deliveries of finished products - weapon systems : details, analysis and conclusions
Epigraph: "We are manufacturing armaments being supplied mainly to Russia, and purchasing them mainly in the same Russia..." (35)
1. Direct Russian deliveries of finished products - weapon systems (AME) to Kazakhstan
The largest deliveries of Russian armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan are deliveries (36) of combat aircraft, according to agreement of 1995, on account of offset (37) against the deployment of strategic bombers on the territory of Kazakhstan (38). The structure and the details of deliveries are presented in table 1. According to the above mentioned agreement, Russia was obliged to deliver 73 aircraft : 21 MiG-29, 14 Su-25 and 38 Su-27 (39). First 43 units were planned for delivery in 1995, remaining 30 in the following two years (40), i. e. until the end of 1997. However, the analysis of declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan at the end of October 1997 in Alma-Aty (41) indicates that till October 1997 42) 41 aircraft, among which only 6 Su-27 had been delivered. Taking into account declared projected delivery of four Su-27 till the end of 1997 and very probable delivery of additional 10 units in the end of 1997- beginning of 1998 (43), it turns out that today unbalanced Russian obligations concerning 73 units of combat aircraft amount to further 18 Su-27 fighters. The official financial evaluation of deliveries data is not known, however , the defense ministers of both states declared, the total value of fighters of different types supplied to Alma-Ata is equal to the worth of all the weaponry taken from Kazakhstan to Russia after disintegration of the USSR (44). In carrying out evaluation of financial equivalent of these deliveries of aircraft in table 1: "Deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan", we obtain their value ca. 1,3 milliard dollars in "minimal" most reliable figures (45) and ca. 2 milliard dollars in "maximal " figures (46). Thus, the volumes of delivery of combat aircraft in financial terms are rather considerable in total and in annual values - estimates are comprised between ca. 280 million dollars in 1995, 256 in 1996, and will be about 800 million dollars in the years 1997-98 (47).
Apart from Russian deliveries of combat aircraft, the transfer of a substantial number of armored vehicles (48) is also mentioned: 55 armored infantry vehicles BMP2, 63 T-72 tanks and 10 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (49). The total value of these deliveries is ca. 94-110 million of dollars (50). It is not known for sure in which form Kazakhstan has paid these deliveries, however, it can be assumed that they have been performed according to "offset" principles without real currency payments (51). Nonetheless, we will use above values for the Russian deliveries volume evaluation (52).
Taking this into account, the total values of Russian deliveries of aircraft and armored equipment to Kazakhstan, executed in 1995 and 1996, would be respectively: 280 million dollars in 1995 (53), 350 million dollars in 1996 and at least 100 million dollars in 1997 (54). These values constitute 4-10 % of the official volume of Russian export of armaments and military equipment for 1995-97. It is not known, how the deliveries made by official Russian organizations (55) to Kazakhstan have been accounted, logically one can suppose, that they were labelled in the "line of deliveries on the basis of intergovernmental agreements". However, firstly, this is rather wide concept, in which can be comprised also deliveries of other types, and, secondly, this title is absolutely not used (56) in the case of discription of the military technical cooperation. Therefore, we have to assume, that the deliveries to Kazakhstan could have been accounted in some other usual (57) way. For example, if one supposes, that they were included in book-keeping records as "deliveries as compensation of Russian debt", then the deliveries to Kazakhstan correspond to almost half of deliveries executed by Russia in 1996 as the offset of the national debt. If they were accounted as " clearing " deliveries, we have an evidence of the absolutely amazing fact, that almost 100 %(!) of clearing armaments deliveries of Russian Federation in 1996 were oriented to Kazakhstan (58).
The deliveries of equipment from Russia to Kazakhstan are confirmation of the fact that the military technical cooperation is not a pure weapons trade. The Russian experts and journalists criticizing Russian politics in the field of military technical cooperation for insufficient economic efficiency or excessive commercialization, intentionally or not consciously forget that the purpose of the "international activity" called military technical cooperation is not only to gain currency resources , but also to "ensure national security, economic and politico-military interests of the state", thus MTC are complex interstate relations with several aspects. The deliveries of equipment to Kazakhstan reach absolutely all targets of the military technical cooperation (59), whereby they are bilateral:
* they ensure a national security and politico-military interests of states - Kazakhstan obtains a modern military equipment corresponding nominally to three air force regiments and four motorized infantry battalions (60) (two of them armored 61)), as a consequence, the increase of level of combat preparedness and efficiency of republican air forces, the strengthening of "Southern, Eastern Kazakhstan-Russian borders control at the Chinese side";
* they safeguard political interests - execution of contracted intergovernmental obligations, realization of interstate agreements on "collective security " and "joint air defense " etc.;
Direct deliveries of weapons systems from Kazakhstan to Russian Federation
The situation of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of armaments and military equipment greatly differs from the above described Russian ones (70). If to consider only direct deliveries of finished weapons systems, among all known officially executed deliveries can be mentioned only export (71) to Russia in 1995 of two fighters MiG-29 and four bombers Su-4M. In corresponding records of Russian Federation imports the import of four "combat aircraft ", without specifying type of aircraft, is mentioned. The details and terms of deliveries are not known. In data about deliveries of 4-6 combat aircraft there is quite a lot of discrepancies:
firstly, differences in number of exported and imported aircraft; secondly, the types of aircraft exported by Kazakhstan makes arise questions why MiG-29, since in the Russian armed forces there are analogous types of fighters (72), and in aviation construction enterprises their substantial quantity is manufactured, why aircraft not needed (for export nor for own air forces)?; and Su-4M bombers, model produced in the years 40 have only historic value, as one of very rare and first bombers of "Su" family 73), but in no way of military-technical importance; finally, why these delivery data have been submitted to United Nations Organization register as export/import data by officials of both states, which should understand the difference between export/import of military equipment and its simple displacement through customs borders, for purposes different from commercial ones? (74)
All these contradictions can be rationally explained. Concerning four Su-4M combat aircraft exported by Kazakhstan, it can be assumed that in given case there was an evident error at one of information processing or publication stages, the name of aircraft was incorrectly labelled, most likely it was the export of four Su-24M (75) (or possibly Su-22M4 or even Tu-22M4 (76)), however, as in the case of MiG-29, the situation is unclear, since in Russia there are substantial quantities of analogous aircraft.
Moreover, since the data on deliveries have been represented to the United Nations Organization register and are labelled as export/import by administration officers of both states, it can be assumed that the combat aircraft were not merely displaced, for example in order to make repairs, but really have been exported/imported for commercial (or military-technical) purposes.
A re-export of combat aircraft of this type to third countries is most probable. Most likely, namely this circumstance explains the difference between numbers of exported and imported combat aircraft: for example, Russia have informed about import of 4 aircraft, although Kazakhstan exported 6, because she was an intermediary in further delivery of 2 of them, or as new owner in case of re-export. Concerning possible countries of destination, to which combat aircraft could be exported, there is no reliable information, however, when analyzing data on composition of aviation of various states furnished by AW & ST and Teal Group Corp. (77), as well as weapons and military equipment deliveries data of Russian Federation and CIS countries for years 1995-98, we conclude that, if the deliveries of these combat aircraft to third countries were executed, most likely they were considered only as Russian, or half-official or unofficial (78).
As a whole, the prospects and the extent of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Russia are only symbolical: Kazakhstan being not a manufacturer of finished units of armaments and military technology, these prospects are limited by transfers of specimens of technology of old Soviet origin (79), deliveries of complete armaments within framework of manufacturing cooperation or joint production (80) etc.
In conclusion, the prospects and the volumes of Kazakhstan's direct deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Russia are limited. The volumes of direct deliveries of complete weapons systems in the nearest future are nil. In any case, the growth of volumes of direct deliveries by Kazakhstan of finished weapons systems to Russia is possible only in case of evident Russian interest, and only with direct Russian participation in manufacturing of the weapons systems.
Notes
1) Kazakhstan administration policy of reinforcement of independence and sovereignty of the country determines also its intention to fix independently orientations of main trends and volumes of the military technical cooperation.
2) the share of Kazakhstan in Russian import - 6, 6 % in 1996 and 5, 2 % in 1997; total Russian import in 1997 amounted to 71 milliard dollars (increase by 6% as compared with 1996) ; "Payment balance of Russia in 1997, "Finansovye Izviestia", 36 (486), 26 / 05 / 1998 3) although the Russian share in Kazakhstan's trade turnover is only 7 % ", according to declaration of Russian Federation Vice-Prime-Minister, Viktor Khristenko, made during the press conference on 8 / 09 / 98 at Almaty.
4) although Russia is interested in testing grounds and defense industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan, due to different reasons, first of all economic ones, the shifting of her interests to mainly testing grounds is most probable; however, Kazakhstan, from viewpoint of its social and economic conditions, is more interested in acquisition of delivery orders for its defense enterprises for re-launching or reorientation of the defense industry.
5) ca.5, 2 mlrd dollars in 1997.
6) the question is about the point of view whole state, although from viewpoint of one or several enterprises the orders amounting to several dozens million dollars are quite interesting.
7) approved in December 1994 by the Council of Defense Ministers of CIS.
8) the author has no reliable information about Kazakhstan's participation in MFPG " Granit ".
9) for Russia, and not for Kazakhstan
10) Andrei Zagorskiy "Export of conventional armaments " No 8-9,1997, PER Center.
11) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of exploitation and lease of the test range Sary-Shagan and ensuring of activities of Priozersk town ", signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
12) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about conditions of exploitation and lease of the Emba testing range " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
13) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on the conditions of use of the 929th national flight test center (the structures and testing grounds located on the territory of Kazakhstan) of the Defense Ministry of Russian Federation " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
14) "Agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on conditions of use of the 4th central national testing range (the structures and testing ranges located on the territory of Kazakhstan) of the Defense Ministry of Russian Federation " signed in Moscow on the 20th January 1995.
15) Although, on the testing ranges leased by Russia, now, the development and tests of weapons systems are carried out For example: September 1997. testing of aerial defense missile system "Bnk-Ml" purchased by Finland in Russia, October 1998. control tests of Tu-160 (X-65) and other.
16) Interview of Nazarbayev "Niezavisimaya Gazieta ", "Russia could become an axe of friendship, but she did not". "NG" daily, dated 16th January 1997.
17) In this case is not known about what periods and testing ranges he speaks. Here, various interpretations are possible: if the testing ranges referred to higher, L e. relating to concluded bilateral agreements, the period would be apparentlyl995-96 (with possible inclusion of preceding year), the maximal "leasing fee" should not exceed 63 million dollars per year. The inclusion of the year 1994 decreases this figure to 42 millions. If this count is made starting with 1992, the annual figure is 25,2 million dollars per year. However, such a "leasing fee " is less probable, since it would be less than 27,5 million dollars per year for four the above mentioned testing ranges.
18) "Kommersant Daily ", 01/04/ 98; "VTS ", Nol3,1998, ITAR-TASS ; electronic data base
"Vega" of INFO-TASS, 29.10.97; "VTS ",No 44,1997.
19) Ibid.
20) "Agreement between Defense Ministry of Russian Federation and Defense Ministry of Kazakhstan on training of officers in military academies " from the 19th August 1992.
21) information of news agencies with references to declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan in Almaty, Renter from 29/10/97; RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97 and other.
22) commercial " deliveries of armaments and military equipment (73 combat aircraft etc.) in offset for nuclear weapons and military equipment retrieved from Kazakhstan. See paragraph "direct deliveries" and tables.
23) it is possible: that the figure 43 million dollars corresponds to lease value for all the testing ranges and military centers, from the time of achieving consensus in bilateral agreements concerning testing ranges.
24) See Supplement 1: "Space base "Baykonur" - protocol".
25) Lease agreement concerning "Baykonur" complex between Government of Russian Federation and government of Kazakhstan from 10th Decembers 1994.
26) It would be more exact to say, that after expiration of the leasing contract on "Baykonur" between the Government of Russian Federation and Kazakstan government from 10th December 1994, which "is extended by ten years, if neither Party will not submit a written notification about its intention to terminate the present agreement at least 6 months prior to its expiration date.
27) Federal law of the Russian Federation about ratification of the agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about main principles and conditions of "Baykonur" space base use;
adopted by the State Duma on 21st July 1994, approved by the Council of Federation on the 7th October 1994.
28) Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation from 29th August 1994 No 996 "0n measures to ensure the implementation of agreement between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan about main principles and conditions of "Baykonur" space base use " from 28th March 1994.
29) "The Government of Russian Federation will decide to open credit for lease payment for complex "Baykonur" and compensation of material expenses of Kazakhstan incurred for maintenance and operation of complex "Baykonur" " - executed in 1992 - 1993 after ratification of a treaty of "Baykonur " complex lease, the federal law of Russian Federation "on ratification of Agreement".
30) "Ministry of Finances of Russian Federation will allocate in 1994 115 million of US dollars to "Baykonur" complex leasing, as well as to "Baykonur" complex maintenance in the limits foreseen by the 1994 federal budget, namely: for Defense Ministry of Russian Federation for space base - 191,2 milliard rubles; for Russian space agency - 179,2 milliard rubles, including 53,8 milliard rubles on exploitation expenses, 17,6 milliard rubles on purchases of serial space technology, 15,8 milliard roubles on civil engineering works, 91 milliard rubles on the maintenance of Leninsk town". The government decree of Russian Federation from 29th August 1994, No 996.
31) Interview of Nazarbayev "Nezavisimaya Gazieta", "Russia could become an axe of friendship, but she did not", "NG" daily, dated 16th January 1997.
32) apparently, this concerns the period 1994-96,115 million dollars per year
33) " Kommersant DAILY ", 01/04/98; "MTC" No 13,1998, ITAR-TASS.
34) Ibid.
35) the interview with the officer of the international security office of the Ministry of Interior of Kazakhstan "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", "NG", 27.07.96, p.3; "MTC", 29 July- 4 August 1996, GK "Rosvooruzhenie ", ITAR-TASS.
36) executed, in execution and planned; deliveries beginning in 1995
37) Agreement on offset for retrieved military equipment, July 1995, within framework of "Agreement on military cooperation" 1994. SIPRI Yearbook 1996 makes reference to information supplied by Interfax agency on the 8th November 1995; "MTC " 25/11/1996.
38) "at the time of USSR disintegration, in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan, the base Dolon according to Western sources) were deployed the 79th heavy bombers division of the 30th Irkutsk air army, comprising 1223rd and 1226th aviation regiments of Tu-95MS (27 Tu-95MS6 and 13 Tu-95MS16), book "Strategic nuclear armaments of Russia ", Moscow, 1998, Center of studies of disarmament problems. This number of strategic bombers of Tu-95M model (40 units) corresponds to half of all the bombers of this type having been in the inventory of Soviet long-range aviation in 1990.
39) Electronic data base "Vega" of INFO-TASS, 29/10/97; "MTC " No 44, 1997, "Rosvooruzhenie ", ITAR-TASS. Reuter news agency has been reporting, that apart from MiG-29, Su-25 and Su-27 to Kazakhstan were supplied also L-39, however the analysis of the total combat aircraft inventory resulting from other sources indicates it was erroneous Information (the for example wrong interpretation of "trainer aircraft" concept and resulting substitution of Su-27UB to trainer aircraft L-39), or else the data concerning trainer planes were not included in the overall total of 73 wombat aircraft ";
40) SIPRI Yearbook 1996, makes reference to Interfax agency information from 8 November 1995
41) Reuter news agency from 29/10/97; Electronic data base "Vega" of INFO-TASS, from 29/10/97;
RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97.
42) declarations of defense ministers of Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, Igor Sergejev and Mukhtar Altynbayev
43) the author's evaluation, probably the date is different -1998
44) information of RIA-Novosti from 30/10/97
45) "minimal most reliable"- the cost value or calculated according to data of analytical agencies
46) "maximal prices" or so-called "market prices", or contract prices for the analogous Russian deliveries to foreign countries
47) if the aircraft equipment deliveries to Kazakhstan will be completed in 1998
48) SIPRI Arms Trade Database 1997
49) see the table "Deliveries of Armaments and military equipment to Kazakhstan
50) analogously, as in the case of aircraft, for "minimal most reliable prices" and "maximal prices"
51) in this case, the "real" total amount of deliveries shall be much lower than 94-100 million dollars, since these deliveries are not commercial deliveries" according to a number of features, and secondly, due to the fact that "they are released from the stock of Russian troops" the price paid for these armaments will be tenfold lower than that of "export products" and there is no information concerning their upgrading up to "export products" standard, the total amount will be substantially lower
52) but not payments!
53) According to SIPRI data the deliveries of armored equipment were executed inl996
54) taking into account 4 Su-27 in 1997; this figure can be increased by 100 million to 350 million dollars, if to take into consideration deliveries of additional 10 Su-27 units; See table 1
55) the situation of deliveries of armaments from Russia to Kazakhstan and the mutual government obligations are such, that it is rather difficult to determine the category to which the deliveries belong, and how they are accounted in official records
56) it means "this concept is not used in mass media, such categories are not mentioned in publications of official organizations (they are used in Russia, in American practice this concept is used, but in somewhat other sense),
57) i.e. among commonly available in the literature, and about which a sufficiently reliable information is available
58) this is quite probable, since there is no reliable detailed information about any "clearing " deliveries in 1996, although the press reports the total annual amount of 350 million dollars
59) in this case all the aspects of MTC are present, whereby financial-economic aspect is minor and does not play the first role, in contrast to majority of deliveries executed by Russia in recent years, as a rule with application of commercial principles, or to be more exact, with prevailing financial-economic aspect. This is true with rare exception of, for example, "free of charge " deliveries of armaments to Bulgaria, planned "financial-political" deliveries of aerial defense systems C-300 to Cyprus. However, it is necessary to notice, that although these deliveries are not purely commercial, the financial-economic considerations, in contrast to Kazakhstan case, are not minor: Cyprus contract firstly, is "paid in hard currency "; secondly, it is rather important in volume; thirdly, it constitutes a breakthrough on the principally new markets by promoting a probable conclusion of large contracts with other states (Greece or Turkey); finally, in the fourth place, according to available information there are also private, not only state's financial interests involved around the contract activities. It's very likely that in Cyprus contract the financial-economic aspect has the same importance, as the political or that it is even much stronger. Concerning Bulgarian deliveries of armored equipment, it is possible that the economic aspect is rather important: firstly, "the bondage" with this equipment occurs with a possibility to make in the future "not-free-of-charge" deliveries of replacement parts, components etc.; secondly, "the bondage" to Russian models of armaments facilitates a conclusion of contracts concerning deliveries of other types of Russian armaments, for example of aviation equipment; thus, it turns out that the economic interests in the given case of "free of charge " deliveries could be also important
60) now Kazakhstan considers the possibility of reforming the organization of its ground forces based until now on the previously existing Soviet system, wherein the division was a main tactical formation of army, and the regiment was a main tactical, structural element of battlefield, to a new one, more mobile system with brigade-battalion; perhaps this circumstance explains the fact that the number of units supplied to Kazakhstan fits better to numbers required by battalion, rather than by regiment.
61) it is understood that in previously existing Soviet ground troops organization system the nominal number of tanks per armored battalion of motorized infantry regiment differs from the number of tanks per battalion of armored regiment
62) the maintenance of production capacities and the achieving of appropriate social goals.
63) achieving of internal technical goals of Russian armed forces.
64) according to available information this principle was respected in deliveries of Su-27 fighters.
65) intergovernmental, it is possible also to say "a kind of offset" deliveries, if all the types of deliveries should be subdivided into those paid in currency and those settled as compensation.
66) though in Kazakhstan this bondage is already maximal.
67) obviously, a pure economic profit-earning in this case is substantially lower than in the case of commercial" deliveries.
68) according to mutual accounts and book-keeping records data
69) for example, the payment of lease for military testing ranges
70) we do not include in our considerations the "retrieval of strategic arms" - ICBM, cruise missiles, the long-range aviation etc.
71) according to data concerning Kazakhstan published in the United Nation Organization register 1995.
72) the term "analogous " in this case is true only in respect to "MiG-29" fighter, it is not known what type of aircraft was supplied to Russia
73) Remark: Su-4 - aircraft model of times of the Second World War: bomber Su-2 with more powerful engine; the manufacturing dates is not known , most likely between years 1942-50; several of units were manufactured;
74) for example, "across-border displacement of equipment in order to make repairs
75) other types of aircraft also are not excluded, for example fighter-bomber Su-34, Tu-24 / Tn-126 AWACS, the bomber Tu-4 etc.. The supposition that Kazakhstan export comprises one of these types of combat airplanes is few probable, though there are interesting coinciding reports in Western press (Defense News, 10-16.03.97. " MTC " Nol5, 1997) about Chinese purchases of four Tu-22/24 bombers (it is not clear what type of aircraft is concerned); moreover it is known that the bomber Tu-4 is exploited in China until now; last year the Chinese order of 4 AWACS aircraft is reported.
76) ... further modification of Tu-22M : Tu-22M3 with improved equipment and extended nomenclature of armament. This is probable model, since it is "adopted in the inventory of Russian air force ", in the Kazakh aeronautical production union are built/modernized several units ordered by the Ministry of Defense. It is quite possible that, if after all this concerns four Tu-22M4, it was the pilot experimental batch of aircraft intended for commissioning and adoption to air force inventory.
77) "World Military Aircraft Inventory ", 1998, 1997, 1996, Teal Group Corp., Aviation Week & Space Technology
* in the case of MiG-29, they could be purely Russian - MiG-29 fighters in 1995-98 had been exported by Russia in rather substantial quantities to several countries;
* concerning deliveries of Su-24M, Su-34 etc. by Russia, a reliable information is not available;
* the press reported information about Russian contract with Vietnam on modernization of 32 Su-22M4;
* there is some information about Ukrainian deliveries of four Su-22 (without precising their model) to Yemen.
79) according to intergovernmental agreements, after subsequent settlement of mutual requirements;
according to any international agreements, etc.
80) for example, marine torpedoes, mines, anti-ship missiles can be classified as "finished weapons systems" and weapons and military equipment, although they are components of armaments for submarines and warships.
