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by Eugene Miasnikov |
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Center for Arms Control, Energy and
Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Russia |
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http://www.armscontrol.ru |
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To be presented at the 16th Summer
Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Beijing, July 17 – 25, 2004 |
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Advantages of UAVs for delivery of terrorist’s
weapons |
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Threats posed by small UAVs |
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Most likely scenarios of UAV application in
attacks by terrorists (case of Russia) |
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UAV composition, technical capabilities and
maximum payload |
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Technical aspects of potential use of commercial
radio controlled model airplanes in a terrorist attack |
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Optimal to attack “area” targets compared to
other means of delivery |
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Relative simplicity of assembling, covertness of
preparation and carrying out an attack. |
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High capability to “penetrate” into areas not
accessible by land. It is almost impossible to prevent an attack once UAV
is launched. |
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Long range and high accuracy can be achieved |
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Relative low cost |
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Strong psychological effect of an attack on
population |
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Two explosions killed 14 people and injured over
50 (later one more died in a hospital) |
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Both “shaheed’s belts” consisted of explosives
(equivalent to 0.5-1 kg TNT) mixed with small metal items (balls, screws,
etc.) |
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Composition of bombs was not optimal to create
maximum energy release. In fact, one of two bombs did not work – its
detonator only exploded.That bomb killed the terrorist herself only. |
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Geometry of the explosions was not optimal as
well. People, killed by the second explosion, effectively shielded those
who were at a distance of few meters from the explosion. |
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Terrorists failed to pass through guards to the
crowded airfield. Panic was prevented. |
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More casualties could have occurred, were the
attacks from the air. |
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UAVs for military applications |
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UAVs for civilian applications |
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Modification of manned aircraft |
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Small UAVs assembled of commercially available
components in a “garage” |
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Modification of commercially available RC
airplane models |
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It is not technically difficult for terrorists
to use small UAVs to carry payloads in a range of 0.5 – 20 kg. Accuracy of
a remotely piloted UAV can be better than 20 m, which is enough to conduct
an efficient area attack with biological, chemical, radiological weapons or
even with conventional explosives. It is very difficult to stop a terrorist
UAV, once it is launched. |
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Attempts to limit the spread of commercially
available model airplanes or their components is at least a questionable
option, if not a viable one. |
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One of the strong measures to prevent
terrorist’s UAV attacks could be increasing public awareness of the
existing threat. |
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Notes