Notes

Outline

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Tools to Deliver Terrorist’s Attacks: Project Goals by Eugene Miasnikov Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Russia  http://www.armscontrol.ru Presentation at the 15th Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Moscow, July 23 – August 1, 2003

What is UAV?

Why a Threat of Terrorist’s UAV Attack Is Growing? Technical progress makes new technologies more accessible for terrorists Increased interest to UAV military applications will likely result in a spin-off effect. Like manned airplanes, UAVs may be used widely for civilian applications in future. Existing air defenses are not efficient against terrorist’s UAVs

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Potential Terrorist’s Targets and Weapons (slide 1) Areas with high concentration of people (crowds, dense populated areas) CB weapons Radiological weapons (“dirty bombs”) Nuclear bombs ??? Conventional (blast fragmentation) weapons

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Features of a Terrorist Attack near Tushino Airfield in Moscow, July 5, 2003 2 explosions killed 14 people and over 50 were injured (later one more died in a hospital) Both “shaheed’s belts” consisted of explosives (equivalent to 0.5-1 kg TNT) mixed with small metal items (balls, screws, etc.) Composition of bombs was not optimal to create maximum energy release. In fact, one of two bombs did not work – its detonator only exploded.That bomb killed the terrorist herself only. Geometry of the explosions was not optimal as well. People, killed by the second explosion, effectively shielded those who were at a distance of few meters from the explosion. Terrorists failed to pass through guards to the crowded airfield. Panic was prevented. More casualties could have occurred, were the attacks from the air.

Potential Terrorist’s Targets and Weapons (slide 2) Key military and civilian infrastructure assets: CB weapons Radiological weapons (“dirty bombs”) Nuclear bombs ??? Conventional (blast fragmentation) weapons Other types of payloads

Range and Payloads of UAVs “Large” UAVs Range ~ few hundreds…10,000 km; Payload > several dozens kg “Medium” UAVs Range ~ few dozens km…few hundreds km; Payload  > 5…several dozens kg   “Small” (mini) UAVs Range ~ few km…few dozens km; Payload  > 0.5…5 kg

Proliferation of “large” UAVs Currently ~ 40 states produce “large” UAVs. Modification is simpler task. Areas of most concern: modification of manned aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles to land attack cruise missiles Terrorist groups can unlikely to make such modifications covertly. Exclusion: states, that do not control their territory Preventing spread of “large” UAVs: Strengthening export controls Strengthening national controls

Export controls for UAVs MTCR restrictions: Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg"payload" to a "range" of at least 300 km (Category I) Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones), capable of a"range" equal to or greater than 300 km (Category II) Technologies and components specified in Category II list September 2002 MTCR plenary meeting in Warsaw made a decision to strengthen control over UAV sales Wassenaar agreement: UAVs for military applications

New MTCR restrictions (May 2003) Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems designed or modified to dispense an aerosol, capable of carrying elements of a payload in the form of a particulate or liquid other than fuel components of such vehicles of a volume greater than 20 litres, and having any of the following: a. An autonomous flight control and navigation capability; or b. Capability of controlled flight out of the direct vision range involving a human operator. Excluded: Model aircraft intended for recreational or competition purposes. UAVs, designed to accept payloads (such as remote sensing equipment, communications equipment), that lack an aerosol dispensing system/mechanism.

Are there loopholes? Can volume of aerosol tanks be increased? At what cost? (Diminishing fuel tanks?) Can a UAV piloted within direct vision range fly longer ranges? (Possible handover piloting or using civilian communication networks) Is it difficult to install aerosol dispensers on UAVs designed for other purposes?

Some aspects of national control of UAVs UAVs used for military applications UAVs used in civilian sector Licensing policy Retaining “negative control” by state representative (?) Need to develop appropriate regulations and legal issues

Proliferation of “medium” UAVs Control of proliferation is more difficult Relatively small cost: ~ $ 10,000 – 50,000 Primary concern: Terrorists can build a capable “medium” UAV in a garage with off the shelf technologies

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Proliferation of mini-UAVs Almost no restrictions for obtaining Kit airplanes are commercial items Obtaining necessary knowledge and skills is not very difficult. Assembling, testing, transportation are easy and could be done covertly Airplane model can take off from many places even in a city (roads, playgrounds, etc.) People around would unlikely pay attention. No special facilities or take-off run  requirements for a model weighing less than 4 kg (payload ~ 0.5 kg).

Why Capabilities of Existing Air Defenses Against UAVs Are Limited? Some important targets can be defended. UAV flight to its target can be very short – no time to react Existing air defenses are designed to deal with large and fast targets. UAVs may have very small cross section Cost of anti-air missile is much higher compared to the cost of a target Problem of “friendly fire” Ukrainian S-200 SAM shut down Tu-154 airliner over the Black Sea instead of a target drone in 2001 Operation “Freedom of Iraq”: “Patriot” SAMs vs friendly aircraft 2:1 Problem of coordination of military and civilian airspace monitoring efforts.

What can be done? Preventive measures aimed at restriction of potential access of terrorists to sensitive technologies and knowledge Strengthening export controls Strengthening state supervision over use of UAVs in the civilian sector State supervision over activity of private aeronautical clubs, sport organizations, etc. (places, where terrorists may obtain knowledge) Increasing public awareness Technical measures to improve air defenses. Simple and cost-effective solutions are needed. Organizational measures